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This article offers a brief overview of the history and
developments of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in
the United States and examines the recent decisions in
Fleischer Studios, Inc v AVELA, Inc. In particular, the
article argues that the courts in Fleischer added an
important element to the interpretation of the doctrine,
namely the fact that the courts seemed willing to resort
to aesthetic functionality to counter the consequences
resulting from the practice of using trade mark law as an
additional form of protection for copyrighted, or once
copyrighted, creative works.

Introduction
This article addresses the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality in the United States, with particular attention
to the recent decisions in Fleischer Studios, Inc v AVELA,
Inc,2 in which the heirs of the creator of the Betty Boop
character were prevented from enforcing the marks in the
image and name of the character, owing in part to claims
of aesthetic functionality. A doctrine that many thought
was largely banished by the courts, aesthetic functionality
has recently re-emerged front and centre in the trade mark
litigation landscape. Notably, in the past three years,
courts have issued several decisions addressing claims
of aesthetic functionality raised by defendants or the

courts themselves. Not surprisingly, these decisions
sparked a rush of opposition among trade mark owners
and trade mark practitioners. In particular, as a result of
these decisions, practitioners started to elaborate lengthy
lists of precautionary measures for trade mark owners to
avoid the “zombie apocalypse” that the revival of
aesthetic functionality could otherwise entail—the
impossibility of enforcing their marks, or even the marks’
cancellation.3 Still, while suggesting strategies for trade
mark owners to follow in order to erect barriers against
future strikes of the doctrine, trade mark practitioners did
not seem to address, or even to investigate, the reasons
that could have caused the recent resurrection of aesthetic
functionality in the first place. Similarly, while blaming
the courts for attacking “their trade marks”, trade mark
owners did not seem to wonder why the judiciary
suddenly returned to resorting to aesthetic functionality,
at times spontaneously. Hence a closer look at the
developments that have characterised trade mark law and
trade mark practice in the recent decades seems to easily
explain the reasons behind the judicial resurrection of the
doctrine in the United States.
Notably, as the scope of trade mark protection has
relentlessly expanded in the past several decades, the
business world has frequently resorted to trade mark law
to attempt to claim exclusive rights in a growing list of
product features, including colours, shapes, smells,
gestures and so on, based on the assertion that these
features are capable of distinguishing products in the
market and, as a result, should be protected as trade
marks.4 These claims, however, have often been met with
controversy, particularly by the courts. As I highlight in
this article, courts in the United States may thus have
resorted to aesthetic functionality, at least in part, to
counter the trend of expansive trade mark protection and
potentially overreaching trade mark claims.5 In particular,
courts may have turned to this doctrine to prevent granting
trade mark rights (and potentially perpetual monopolies)
in important product features that could put competitors
at a significant “non-reputation-related”6 disadvantage
with respect to non-technical (non-utilitarian) product
aspects—such as product styles, presentation, packaging
and aesthetic appearance—which are nonetheless
fundamental to compete in today’s economy. Still, the
recent decisions in Fleischer added an important element
to this analysis, namely the fact that it is likely that the
courts resorted to aesthetic functionality to counter the

1
I thank Rebecca Tushnet for reading this Article and providing insightful suggestions. An earlier version of this Article was presented at a CLE workshop at the Faculty
of Law of the National University of Singapore in March 2013.
2
See Fleischer Studios, Inc v AVELA, Inc 636 F. 3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn by Fleischer Studios, Inc v AVELA, Inc 654 F. 3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011); Fleischer
Studios, Inc v AVELA, Inc 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Fleischer Studios, Inc v AVELA, Inc 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Fleischer Studios, Inc v
AVELA, Inc 925 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Owing to the limited scope of this article, I do not comprehensively elaborate on the theoretical issues, and practical
problems, that (still) affect the application of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality in the US. For a general overview and critique of the doctrine, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
“The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law” (1999) 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611; Annette Kur, “Too Pretty to Protect? Trade Mark Law and The Enigma
of Aesthetic Functionality” in Josef Drexl et al. (eds), Technology and Competition: Contribution in Honour of Hanns Ullrich (2009), p.139 (addressing the doctrine both
in the US and in Europe); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, Vol.1 (2013), §7:81.
3
See B. Brett Heavner, “Trademark Aesthetic Functionality: A Zombie Apocalypse?“ (2012) 85 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 196..
4
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Samara Brothers, Inc 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Qualitex Co v Jacobson Prods Co 514 U.S. 159 (1995); Two Pesos, Inc v Taco Cabana, Inc
505 U.S. 763, 765 (1992); In re Slokevage 441 F. 3d 957 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc v Gentile Productions 134 F. 3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998);
Frederick Warne & Co v Book Sales, Inc 482 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Clarke 17 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990). See also Mark A. Lemley, “The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense” (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1687.
5
See Mark McKenna, “(Dys)functionality” (2012) 48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 824 (offering a detailed reconstruction of the doctrine and advocating for a broader application).
6
TrafFix Devices v Mktg Displays 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
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consequences resulting from the growing practice of using
trade mark law as an additional form of protection for
copyrighted, or once copyrighted, creative works. As the
Ninth Circuit initially stated in Fleischer (even though
the court later retracted its words), to grant trade mark
rights in creative works would essentially imply that these
works would “never enter the public domain”7 in breach
of the societal bargain that originally justifies copyright
protection in these works.8 In this article, after a brief
overview of the history and developments of the doctrine
of aesthetic functionality, I examine the Fleischer
decisions and address their impact, particularly with
respect to the possibility of resorting to trade mark
protection for works protected, or once protected, under
copyright law in the future.

A brief primer on aesthetic functionality
The doctrine of aesthetic functionality originates from a
comment in the 1938 Restatement of Torts according to
which product features may be functional “when goods
are bought largely for their aesthetic value”.9 In 1952, the
Ninth Circuit famously applied this definition in Pagliero
v Wallace China Co.10 Pagliero, a china manufacturer and
longtime competitor of Wallace, copied four distinctive
china patterns from Wallace. Wallace sued Pagliero, but
the Ninth Circuit denied the claim because it found that
the patterns were aesthetically functional and thus not
protectable. More generally, the court stated that when
“[a] particular feature is an important ingredient in the
commercial success of a product, the interest of free
competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent
and copyright”.11 The court also distinguished aesthetically
functional features (that could be copied by competitors)
from features that were “mere arbitrary embellishment[s]
… [which are] primarily adopted for purposes of
identification … [and are] unrelated to basic consumer
demands in connection with the product”. For the latter,
the court accepted that “imitation may be forbidden”.12
Not surprisingly, the Pagliero decision and its application
of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality were met with
scepticism. In particular, the doctrine was criticised
because it paradoxically seemed to penalise “successful
designs”, which could be freely copied, against
aesthetically unappealing ones, which could be protected
as trade marks.13 The doctrine was also criticised because

it was essentially, and problematically, transforming the
judiciary into arbiters of products’ aesthetic appeal. As a
result of the doctrine, the judiciary was asked to ultimately
decide what was too pretty to be protected.14
Probably because of this scepticism, aesthetic
functionality was not meaningfully invoked, after
Pagliero, for almost three decades. Then, in 1980, the
Ninth Circuit resurrected it in International Order of Job’s
Daughters v Lindeburg & Co,15 where the court held that
the unauthorised manufacture and sale of jewellery
bearing a fraternity insignia was permitted because the
insignia was used as a functionally aesthetic component
of the jewellery and not as a trade mark. Specifically, the
court stated that:
“Trademark law does not prevent a person from
copying so-called functional features of a product
which constitute the actual benefit that the consumer
wishes to purchase, as distinguished from assurance
that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed
a product.”16
Immediately, the decision was met with fear by various
industries that saw in the ruling a potential death sentence
against the possibility of developing (highly lucrative)
licensing and merchandising practices. Perhaps owing to
intense lobbying by trade mark owners, just one year
later, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed course and
drastically limited the doctrine in Vuitton et Fils SA v J.
Young Enterprises.17 Here, the court explicitly denied that
the defendant’s copying of the famous LV logo could be
justified under a claim of aesthetic functionality. Against
the defendant’s argument that the LV mark was the reason
why consumers purchased the product (similar to Job’s
Daughters), the court specified that this did not override
the fact that the LV mark was still used to identify the
source of products, and thus copying it amounted to trade
mark infringement.18 Louis Vuitton and the owners of
other famous marks certainly felt more comfortable after
this ruling, which seemed to clarify that famous marks
were not going to be held functional just because
consumers may purchase these products primarily (if not
only) because of the marks that are affixed to (and
decorate) the products. After Vuitton, the doctrine seemed
to become dormant and when in 2001 the Ninth Circuit

7

Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dastar Corp v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp 539 U.S. 23, 37 (U.S. 2003)).
Copyright law in the US derives its authority from the intellectual property clause of the Constitution, in which Congress shall have the power “to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries”: U.S. art.I, §8, cl.8
(emphasis added). In contrast, trade mark law derives its authority from the commerce clause of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have power “to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”: U.S. art.I, §8, cl.3.
9
Restatement of Torts §742, cmt a (1938).
10
Pagliero v Wallace China Co 198 F. 2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
11
Pagliero v Wallace 198 F. 2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
12
Pagliero v Wallace 198 F. 2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
13
For a detailed review of the decision, see Dinwoodie, “The Death of Ontology” (1999) 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611, 691.
14
See Kur, “Too Pretty to Protect?” in Technology and Competition (2009), p.139.
15
International Order of Job’s Daughters v Lindeburg & Co 633 F. 2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
16
Job’s Daughters 633 F. 2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[i]t is not uncommon for a name or emblem that serves in one context as a collective mark or trademark also to be
merchandised for its own utility to consumers”).
17
Vuitton et Fils SA v J. Young Enterprises, Inc 644 F. 2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
18
Vuitton et Fils v J. Young Enterprises 644 F. 2d 769, 774–775 (9th Cir. 1981).
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again was faced with it in Clicks Billiards, Inc v
Sixshooters, Inc, the court even dismissed having resorted
to it in the past.19
In the meantime, other courts resorted to the aesthetic
functionality,20 including the Second Circuit, which
interpreted the doctrine narrowly compared to the Ninth
Circuit. Specifically, in 1991 the Second Circuit embraced
aesthetic functionality in Wallace International v
Godinger,21 where the court denied the plaintiff, a seller
of high-end silverware under the name Grand Baroque,
relief against the defendant’s use of a similar style for its
(not high-end) silverware under the name 20th Century
Baroque. In that case, the court affirmed that Wallace’s
silverware was “functional” and therefore not eligible for
protection under the Lanham Act because granting
protection to Wallace’s silverware would significantly
hinder competition by limiting the range of alternative
designs to competitors.22 Notably, the court emphasised
that Wallace was seeking protection for the “basic
elements of a decorative style” and not for a particular
and distinctive expression of it.23 A few years later, in
1993, the Second Circuit again adopted the same test in
Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke KG v THC Sys, Inc,
a case with facts similar to Pagliero.24 The court, however,
did not find that the chinaware patterns in question were
functional this time and granted trade mark protection to
the patterns. Perhaps because of the different approaches
followed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, or simply
because of the relevance of aesthetic product features for
market competition, the Supreme Court also considered
the impact of trade mark protection for aesthetic features
as part of the court’s analysis of the issue of functionality
in trade mark law in general.
In particular, in Qualitex Co v Jacobson Products Co25
in 1995 the Supreme Court articulated a definition of
“aesthetic value” and “functionality”. Starting from the
definition of the 1993 Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition,26 the court underlined that:
“The functionality doctrine … forbids the use of a
product’s feature as a trademark where doing so will
put a competitor at significant disadvantage because

the feature is ‘essential to the use or purpose of the
article’ or ‘affects [its] cost or quality of the
article’.”27
The court also said that “[t]he functionality doctrine []
protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to
the recognition or reputation) that trademark protection
… imposes[s], namely their inability to reasonably
replicate important non-reputation-related features”.28 Six
years later, in 2001, the court returned to the issue in
TrafFix Devices, Inc v Marketing Displays, Inc.29 In this
case, recalling its opinion in Inwood Laboratories, Inc v
Ives Laboratories, Inc,30 the court clarified the test for
utilitarian and aesthetic functionality. In particular, the
court first specified that a feature would fit the utilitarian
functionality test “if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article”.31 Should a feature not be functional under this
test, the court stated that it could still be aesthetically
functional if the “exclusive use of [the feature] would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage”.32 Post-TrafFix, courts turned primarily to
this test when considering claims of aesthetic
functionality, even though ambiguity remained, and
remains, as to what precisely constitutes, in practice, a
“non-reputation-related disadvantage”.33 Notably, in 2006,
the Ninth Circuit followed this test in Au-Tomotive Gold
v Volkswagen34 to conclude that the use of famous marks
on promotional products was not aesthetically functional
because the marks in question were still used to indicate
commercial source, at least at large.35
After Au-Tomotive Gold, the doctrine again became
dormant and seemed to have lost its relevance altogether.36
But, in 2010, the Seventh Circuit found that a trade mark
in a round beach towel was invalid under the TrafFix test
in Jay Franco & Sons, Inc v Franek.37 In his opinion,
Judge Easterbrook not only endorsed aesthetic
functionality but also added that fashion “is a form of
function” and “[a] design’s aesthetic appeal can be as
functional as its tangible characteristics”.38 Similarly, in
2011, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York found that the colour red, as applied to the outsole

19
Clicks Billiards Inc v Sixshooters, Inc 251 F. 3d 1252, 1260–1262 (9th Cir. 2001) (“this circuit has [not] adopted the ‘aesthetic functionality’ theory, that is, the notion
that a purely aesthetic feature can be functional”).
20
Brunswick Corp v British Seagull Ltd 35 F. 3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Deere & Co v Farmhand, Inc 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff’d 721 F. 2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983).
21
Wallace Int’l Silversmith v Godinger Silver Art 916 F. 2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
22
Wallace v Godinger 916 F. 2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1990).
23
Wallace v Godinger 916 F. 2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that Wallace could have exclusivity on a precise expression of the baroque style upon a showing of secondary
meaning).
24
Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke KG v THC Sys, Inc 999 F. 2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1993).
25
Qualitex Co v Jacobson Prods Co 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
26
Qualitex v Jacobson 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (“if a design’s ‘aesthetic value’ lies in the ability to ‘confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by
the use of alternative designs,’ then the design is ‘functional’”).
27
Qualitex v Jacobson 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
28
Qualitex v Jacobson 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
29
TrafFix Devices v Mktg Displays 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
30
Inwood Labs v Ives Labs 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
31
TrafFix 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
32
TrafFix 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).
33
See Dippin’ Dots, Inc v Frosty Bites Distrib. LLC 369 F. 3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2004).
34
Au-Tomotive Gold v Volkswagen 457 F. 3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).
35
Au-Tomotive Gold 457 F. 3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
36
See Ferrari SpA Esercizio v Roberts 944 F. 2d 1235 (6th Cir. 2004); Devan Designs, Inc v Palliser Furniture Corp 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1991 (M.D.N.C. 1992).
37
Jay Franco & Sons, Inc v Franek 615 F. 3d 855 (7th Cir. 2010).
38
Jay Franco v Franek 615 F. 3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010).

[2014] E.I.P.R., Issue 2 © 2014 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors

Betty Boop and the Return of Aesthetic Functionality 83
of women’s shoes, was aesthetically functional in
Christian Louboutin SA v Yves Saint-Laurent America
Holding, Inc.39 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed,
finding the ruling contrary to Qualitex, which held that
colours could be trade marks.40 The decision was
nonetheless a victory for the defendant because the court
ruled that the mark was valid only when used as a contrast
mark. In other words, Louboutin’s red outsoles were
protected only when used with respect to black or other
coloured shoes, while Yves Saint-Laurent remained free
to produce entirely red shoes, including red outsoles.41 In
2012, the same District Court in New York rejected
Guess’s claim that Gucci’s “Diamond Motif” was
aesthetically functional in Gucci America, Inc v Guess?
Inc,42 but Guess appealed and an appeal is pending on
that case (in the meantime, Gucci received bad news from
a similar dispute in Italy).43 Still in 2012, the Sixth Circuit
also addressed aesthetic functionality, but found that the
dripping wax seal applied to Maker’s Mark bourbon
bottles was not aesthetically functional in Maker’s Mark
Distillery v Diageo North America.44 Back to the West
Coast, in 2011 the District Court for the Central District
of California also resorted to aesthetic functionality in
Mattel, Inc v MGA Entertainment, Inc, where the court
found that the Bratz doll packaging was aesthetically
functional and thus should not be protected.45 As I
elaborate below, the same court ruled in 2011 and 2012
that the image and name of the Betty Boop character were
aesthetically functional in the Fleischer decisions. The
Ninth Circuit also had its say on this case, adding an
important element to the interpretation of aesthetic
functionality in the United States.

Oh my! The thrills and chills of the Betty
Boop judicial play
2011 and 2012 were busy years for the Betty Boop
character, who performed the leading role in a litigation
play that gave rise to many fears among trade mark
owners. Courts in California were the forum for this play,
which will certainly have relevant implications in the
future with respect to the scope of trade mark protection
for works protected, or once protected, by copyright. To
briefly summarise the dispute, the cartoonist Max Fleisher
created the character of Betty Boop in the 1930s.46 A

decade later, Fleischer sold his rights to the character and
dissolved his company.47 In the early 1970s, Max
Fleischer’s family revived the Fleischer cartoon business
and reasserted ownership in the character of Betty Boop,
even though the chain of title to the copyright in the
character remained fractured, and Fleischer could not
assert clear copyright ownership on it.48 Fleischer
additionally submitted applications to federally register
as trade marks the image and name of the Betty Boop
character and started to license the character to third
parties for use in connection with toys, dolls and so forth.49
Meanwhile, AVELA, an independent poster company,
also used the character of Betty Boop on posters, dolls
and apparel, but without seeking authorisation from
Fleischer. AVELA’s merchandise incorporated elements
(including images and the words “Betty Boop”) from
vintage Betty Boop movie posters that AVELA had
restored and believed to be in the public domain. Fleischer
opposed AVELA’s use of the Betty Boop character, and,
based on the fact that AVELA’s merchandise was not
authorised, pleaded claims for copyright infringement,
trade mark infringement and several related state law
claims against AVELA in front of the District Court of
the Central District of California.
The District Court, however, denied Fleischer’s claims
and granted summary judgment to AVELA, holding that
Fleischer held neither a valid copyright nor a valid trade
mark in the character.50 With respect to the copyright
claim, the court noted, in particular, that Fleischer was
unable to establish a clear chain of title transferring the
original copyright in the character back to Fleischer.
Accordingly, the court rejected the copyright claim in the
absence of evidence that Fleischer was the legitimate
copyright owner.51 The court also argued that Fleischer
failed to adequately document the trade mark rights that
Fleischer supposedly had in the Betty Boop character and
name. Notably, on one side, the court held that Fleischer
failed to submit proper evidence that it had a registered
federal trade mark in the Betty Boop image (which
Fleischer failed to place in the record).52 On the other side,
with respect to the BETTY BOOP word mark, the court
noted that, while Fleischer did include the registration in
the record, Fleischer still failed to provide evidence that
the mark had become incontestable, which in turn the
court used as grounds to deny that the mark had achieved

39

Christian Louboutin SA v Yves St Laurent Am. Holding, Inc 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Christian Louboutin v Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc 696 F. 3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2012).
41
Christian Louboutin v Yves Saint Laurent 696 F. 3d 206, 227–228 (2d Cir. 2012) (not offering, however, a complete analysis of the claim of aesthetic functionality).
42
Gucci Am., Inc v.Guess?, Inc 868 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
43
On May 2, 2013, the Milan Court of First Instance dismissed Gucci’s claims against Guess for trade mark infringement in Italy. See Eleonora Rosati, “Milan Court of
First Instance Rules in Favour of Guess in the Gucci/Guess Saga“ (May 8, 2013), The IPKat Blog, http://ipkitten.blogspot.sg/2013/05/milan-court-of-first-instance-rules
-in.html [Accessed December 2, 2013].
44
Maker’s Mark Distillery v Diageo North America 679 F. 3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012).
45
Mattel, Inc v MGA Entm’t, Inc & Consol. Actions 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
46
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
47
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1117–1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
48
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
49
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011).
50
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (granting summary judgment to AVELA for the copyright claim and reserving ruling for the
trade mark and unfair competition claims); Fleischer Studios v AVELA 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (granting summary judgment to AVELA for the trade
mark claims).
51
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1152–1153 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
52
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 772 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
40
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secondary meaning.53 Finally, the court held that Fleischer
had not established that it owned common law trade marks
in Betty Boop’s name or image.54 In summary, the court
declared a fully fledged victory for AVELA. Fleisher
then appealed to the Ninth Circuit.55
In what would later become known as Fleischer I, the
Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the lower court’s decision
in its entirety. First, the court affirmed the rejection of
the copyright claim based upon the fractured chain of
title.56 Secondly, the court affirmed the rejection of the
trade mark claims.57 Yet the court added a highly
controversial twist that immediately hit trade mark owners
like an earthquake—namely, the court resorted,
spontaneously, to the doctrine of aesthetic functionality
and invoked nothing less than its (terrorising) decision
in Job’s Daughters58 that everyone thought had long been
forgotten. In particular, based on the lack of evidence that
consumers had actually inferred a connection between
Fleischer’s and AVELA’s products, the Ninth Circuit
held that AVELA was not using the Betty Boop image
and name as trade marks. On the contrary, the court held
that AVELA was using the image and name “as a
functional product” or “functional aesthetic components”
that did not have a source-identifying purpose and thus
could not be protected.59 If this was not enough to make
trade mark owners despair, the Ninth Circuit proceeded
to reference a second case not cited by the parties—the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp v Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp60—this time to limit the effects
of the practice of claiming trade mark rights in creative
works once copyright protection had expired (or was not
enforceable). In particular, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
granting trade mark rights in the Betty Boop character
implied that the “character would essentially never enter
the public domain”, which “would run directly contrary
to Dastar”.61 In Dastar, the Supreme Court held that
where a work was in the public domain, a party could not
assert a trade mark claim against an alleged infringer
because this would create “a species of mutant copyright
law that limits the public’s federal right to ‘copy and to
use’ expired copyrights”.62

Obviously in disagreement, several trade mark owners
and trade mark lawyers condemned the decision for
having “misapplied the doctrine of aesthetic functionality,
flinging the door wide open for infringers and
counterfeiters to use valuable logos with impunity”.63
Numerous amicus briefs, including from the International
Trademark Association, were filed in support of
Fleischer’s motion for a panel rehearing or a rehearing
en banc in the case. Amici contended, in particular, that
the Ninth Circuit overruled its own precedent in
Au-Tomotive Gold and “reincarnated sua sponte the
outdated and much-criticized aesthetic functionality
doctrine [of Job’s Daughters]”.64 Amici additionally
argued that, by invoking Dastar, the court had
misinterpreted the Supreme Court’s holding and applied
it to a case where copyright was not yet expired (even
though protection was not enforceable owing to lack of
evidence about copyright ownership).65 Eventually, to the
(partial) relief of trade mark owners and practitioners, the
Ninth Circuit withdrew its original opinion and issued a
new superseding opinion, which became known as
Fleischer II.66 This time, the court did not resort to
aesthetic functionality and did not even mention Job’s
Daughters or Dastar.67 Still, the court upheld judgment
for AVELA on the copyright claim and on the image
mark claim.68 Notably, the court found in favour of
AVELA because, as a matter of law, Fleischer had not
produced sufficient evidence of secondary meaning in
the Betty Boop image, and thus the issue was not triable.69
The court also found that the fractured ownership history
of the word mark BETTY BOOP was not conclusive
evidence of lack of secondary meaning and remanded for
further proceedings.70 Finally, the court vacated and
remanded the ruling on the word mark claim. Although
not fully satisfied with the ruling, trade mark owners were
at least relieved to have defeated (so they thought) the
reappearance of aesthetic functionality.
To the dismay of trade mark owners, however, the
District Court again resurrected aesthetic functionality
on remand while ruling on the claim for the word mark
BETTY BOOP.71 Here again, the court ruled that AVELA
used the name “Betty Boop” not as a source identifier but
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as a decorative element on its products.72 Furthermore,
the court stated that, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit
abandoned its reliance on the doctrine in Fleischer II,
“the reasoning set forth inFleischer I [was] nevertheless
sound and applicable”73 to the case, and thus also in the
future. The court additionally reiterated that the holdings
in Job’s Daughters and Au-Tomotive Gold were
controlling precedents in this case. Accordingly, based
upon the Au-Tomotive Gold test (from TrafFix), the court
held that AVELA’s use of the words “Betty Boop” was
not functional in the utilitarian sense, yet the mark was
aesthetically functional because the “protection of the
feature as a trademark would impose a significant
non-reputation-related competitive disadvantage on
[AVELA]”.74 Namely, the court noted that if AVELA
was to market its goods bearing the image of Betty Boop
or Betty Boop movie posters without the possibility to
use the words “Betty Boop” to identify the character,
“that would make their products less marketable than the
same product that included the BETTY BOOP name”.75
Ultimately, the court was clearly set to find that AVELA
should be allowed to use the name of the character to
identify its products. Indeed, the court added that, should
“[d]efendants’ use of the mark [not be] aesthetically
functional, then it is ‘fair use’”.76 In particular, the court
said that AVELA could not identify products depicting
the character but with the character’s own name—Betty
Boop. Interestingly, Fleischer did not appeal this ruling.

Aesthetic functionality—a bitter
medicine against “mutant copyrights”?
Not surprisingly, the decisions in Fleisher deeply
concerned trade mark owners and trade mark practitioners
across the United States, predicting new attacks from the
now fully resurrected doctrine of aesthetic functionality.
As an immediate reaction, a growing number of
professional publications started to provide specific
strategic advice to trade mark owners in order to avoid
the dramatic consequences of a finding of aesthetic
functionality—that is, the loss of their marks—while
simultaneously voicing criticism against the doctrine that
many believed (and hoped) to be extinct and that had
instead re-emerged with full force.77 In these professional
publications, practitioners ultimately attempted to reassure
trade mark owners that, “with appropriate planning and
care, [they should have] no reason to fear a trademark

zombie apocalypse”.78 In particular, based upon the
analysis of the recent decisions, practitioners highlighted
the most common missteps that could expose trade mark
owners to claims of aesthetic functionality, and to which
trade mark owners should pay special attention to avoid
the loss of their marks. In this respect, practitioners
stressed that the following missteps could lead to a finding
of aesthetic functionality: the failure to properly document
trade mark registrations, the failure to purport the mark
as a source identifier (for example, on the products or
product packaging), the lack of enforcement and above
all the fact that trade mark owners themselves emphasised
the aesthetic character of the mark in advertising or
otherwise. On the contrary, practitioners emphasised that
the safest approach that trade mark owners should adopt
to successfully withstand claims of aesthetic functionality
continued, and continues, to be to “consistently treat[]
trademarks and trade dress as ‘source identifiers’” and
“avoid[] statements highlighting a function that would
be important to competitors”, besides “carefully
document[ing] all trademark rights for use in litigation”.79
Unfortunately, however, while developing these
“damage control” strategies, trade mark practitioners did
not seem to examine the causes—the fundamental
reasons—that may have triggered the return of aesthetic
functionality in the trade mark litigation landscape in the
first instance. Hence a closer look at the developments
that have characterised trade mark law and practice in the
recent decades seems to indicate that the judicial revival
of the doctrine may be directly connected to (and may
represent a judicial push-back against) the relentless
expansion of the scope of trade mark protection.80 In
particular, the analysis of recent decisions invoking the
doctrine seems to show that courts remain resistant, on
the whole, to awarding trade mark protection to basic
elements of decorative styles, shapes of products or
product packaging, basic colours, and so on—despite
changes in trade mark law now permitting such protection.
Granting exclusive protection in these features could in
fact severely limit important aspects of market
competition, not with respect to technologically related
features (barred from protection under utilitarian
functionality), but in terms of current product styles,
colours, aesthetic appeal and so on, which nevertheless
represent fundamental elements to compete in today’s
market economy.81 This was most certainly the case in
the recent decisions in Jay Franco82 and Mattel,83 and
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partially in Louboutin,84 where the courts prohibited or
limited trade mark protection on product shapes and
colours that, if monopolised by trade mark owners, could
severely impair market competition on product features
that, albeit functional in a non-utilitarian way, were still
essential to compete in the marketplace. On the contrary,
courts seemed less resistant and ultimately did not find
that using famous marks or established trade dresses to
enhance products’ aesthetic appeal amounted to aesthetic
functionality when the use of these marks could still play
an important role as source indicators for consumer.85
This consideration was most likely what “saved” the
marks at issue in Gucci America86 and Maker’s Mark
Distillery,87 where the courts found that the marks were
not functional because they still served a
source-identifying function for consumers.88
Yet the Fleischer decisions undoubtedly added, first
explicitly and then implicitly, an unprecedented twist to
the judicial interpretation of the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality. In particular, concerns over market
competition in aesthetically related features did not seem
to be the only reason that drove the courts to resort to the
doctrine in order to declare that the image and name of
Betty Boop could be freely used by AVELA. Instead, the
courts seemed to invoke the doctrine (also, if not
primarily) to counter the negative effects that would
otherwise result from the possibility of protecting the
Betty Boop character (her name and image) also as a trade
mark, in addition to the protection already granted to the
character (and no longer applicable) under copyright law.89
In this respect, the (pre-litigation) story of Betty Boop is
not unique. As an increasingly common trend in the
business world, copyright owners frequently turn to
overlapping copyright and trade mark protection for their
works to enjoy double protection (as copyrights and trade
marks) during the copyright term or to maintain exclusive
rights in the works as trade marks once the copyright has
expired.90 Even though creative works often qualify for
trade mark protection because they can be considered
distinctive, and thus capable of identifying products in
the marketplace, extending such protection to these works
remains nonetheless problematic. This additional layer
of protection may in fact directly interfere with the
public’s exploitation of the work during or after the

duration of copyright protection and, as a result,
negatively affect the copyright bargain upon which
copyright protection is granted in the first place (to
characters and any other creative works). In particular,
concurrent overlapping trade mark protection during the
copyright term may restrict the scope of copyright fair
use and prevent the creation of independent works (which
are legitimate works under copyright law even while
possibly being infringements under trade mark law).91
Even more problematically, sequential trade mark
protection after the expiration of the copyright term may
ultimately prevent creative works from entering the public
domain altogether, which directly forecloses public access
to these works, in clear breach of the copyright bargain.92
This was precisely the situation that the courts had to face
in Fleischer, and for which they decided to resort to
aesthetic functionality.
The fact that the Fleischer courts were uncomfortable
with the consequences of overlapping trade mark and
copyright protection in the Betty Boop character was
engraved in the heart of the opinion in Fleischer I. Here,
the Ninth Circuit wrote that trade mark protection in the
character would create a perpetual monopoly and prevent
Betty Boop from ever entering the public domain, which
was contrary to the holding in Dastar.93 To prevent this
from happening, the court held that the character was
aesthetically functional.94 Since the current status of trade
mark law did not allow the court to deny trade mark
protection in the character based on a subject-matter
exclusion, the court thus found in aesthetic functionality
a flexible doctrine to still permit AVELA (and others) to
copy and use the Betty Boop character, in spite of the fact
that the character was protected as a mark. Owing to
pressure from trade mark owners, who vociferously
argued that the court had stretched the Dastar ruling too
far to include a work that was not officially in the public
domain, the court ultimately scrapped Fleischer I and
issued Fleischer II. In this opinion, the court did not
mention Dastar.95 Still, the court again declared that, even
though Fleischer had valid trade mark rights in the image
of Betty Boop, it could not enforce them against AVELA
because the mark did not have secondary meaning. In
other words, the court manoeuvred to still permit that the
public and competitors could freely copy and use the

84

Christian Louboutin v Yves Saint Laurent 696 F. 3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).
See McKenna, “(Dys)functionality” (2012) 48 Hous. L. Rev. 823, 853–858 (advocating a more nuanced approach to findings of aesthetic functionality to include cases
where “the feature at issue might indicate to consumers something about source”).
86
Gucci v Guess? 868 F. Supp. 2d 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
87
Maker’s Mark Distillery v Diageo 679 F. 3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012).
88
See Au-Tomotive Gold 457 F. 3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that claims of aesthetic functionality would be successful for features “that serve an aesthetic purpose
wholly independent of any source-identifying function”). Courts thus confirmed that marks can be used to identify promotional products even when consumers purchase
these products primarily because of the mark. See also Irene Calboli, “The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising” [2011] U. Ill. L. Rev. 865.
89
See Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011).
90
See, e.g., Irene Calboli, “Trademarking Creative Works: Trends and Negative Effects on the Copyright Equilibrium” in Susy Frankel and Daniel Gervais (eds), Evolution
and Equilibrium: Copyright This Century (forthcoming 2014).
91
Lyons P’ship, LP v Morris Costumes, Inc 243 F. 3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the owners of the purple child-friendly dinosaur Barney had valid trade mark
and copyright in the character); Video Pipeline, Inc v Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc 275 F. Supp. 2d 543 (D.N.J. 2003) (holding that copying Disney picture’s “previews”
including Disney characters was trade mark infringement).
92
See, e.g., Frederick Warne & Co v Book Sales, Inc 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (D.C.N.Y. 1979) (finding that the character of Peter Rabbit could be protected as a trade
mark).
93
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).
94
Fleischer Studios v AVELA 636 F. 3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011).
95
See discussion in section “Oh my! The thrills and chills of the Betty Boop judicial play” above.
85

[2014] E.I.P.R., Issue 2 © 2014 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors

Betty Boop and the Return of Aesthetic Functionality 87
character of Betty Boop also under Fleischer II.96
Concerns over overlapping rights continued to surface as
well in the latest District Court decision, where the court
had to decide, on remand, on the word mark. Notably,
the court explicitly stated the reasoning in Fleischer I was
still applicable to the dispute and turned to aesthetic
functionality to permit AVELA to use the name “Betty
Boop”, arguing that otherwise AVELA could suffer a
significant non-reputation disadvantage for not being able
to market the products (which could be freely produced
and distributed under Fleischer II) using the character’s
name.97
In summary, the Fleischer courts certainly wrote an
important chapter in the interpretation of the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality in the United States. After the
decisions in Fleischer, it seems that courts could resort
to the doctrine to set creative works free in the public
domain after the expiration of the copyright term or when
copyright protection does not apply, regardless of the
additional layer of protection that these works have
acquired as trade marks. Certainly, even after the
Fleischer decisions and in light of other recent decisions,
the doctrine of aesthetic functionality remains an unclear
doctrine,98 particularly because of the fact that its
application remains on a case-by-case basis—what is “too
pretty to be protected”?—which in turn makes the
outcome of judicial decisions difficult to predict and
potentially inconsistent. Still, despite the doctrine’s
imperfection, the possibility of resorting to aesthetic
functionality remains a useful tool for the judiciary and
for the trade mark system as a whole, both as an
applicable defence against claims of infringement ex post
and as a deterrence factor against overreaching claims ex
ante. Ultimately, despite trade mark owners’ and trade
mark practitioners’ criticism, the resurrection of aesthetic
functionality seems to have already resulted in some
positive developments in trade mark law, as also (perhaps
involuntarily) acknowledged by professional publications.
Notably, trade mark owners across the United States are
now attentively considering practitioners’ advice to use
their marks as source identifiers and avoid claiming
protection for (or at minimum not portraying their marks
as) features that could be held important for market
competition. On the contrary, trade mark rights could be
forfeited by claims of aesthetic functionality—the
resurrecting “zombie apocalypse”. Perhaps the result of
an imperfect doctrine, this return on the part of trade mark
owners to appreciating the fundamental principles that

justify, and should continue to justify, trade mark
protection—namely that trade marks should be protected
only insofar as they indicate commercial origin and not
as aesthetic components of products per se—could be
considered, on balance, a positive result for the trade mark
system.

Conclusion
Since its judicial appearance in Pagliero in 1952, the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality has been controversial.
After several decades of hiding and reappearing, courts
have resorted with increasing frequency to the doctrine
in recent years, primarily as a counterweight against the
expansion of trade mark protection. Notably, in a society
where trade mark owners would probably trade mark the
“sun and the moon”,99 courts seems to have found in
aesthetic functionality an imperfect, yet perhaps
necessary, response to the obvious imbalances for
important aspects of market competition that would
otherwise be affected by overreaching trade mark claims.
As trade mark owners are reflecting on recent judicial
decisions and adapting their trade mark strategies
accordingly, only time will tell whether the courts will
continue to resort to aesthetic functionality and to what
specific extent. The decisions in Fleischer, however, have
added an important twist to the interpretation of the
doctrine in that the courts have indicated, first explicitly
and then implicitly, that they are willing to resort to the
doctrine to defend the copyright bargain against claims
of trade mark protection in creative works for which
copyright protection had expired, or was not applicable.
Even though the Ninth Circuit changed its actual wording
from Fleischer I to Fleischer II, the idea that creative
works should enter the public domain once copyright
protection ends, or does not apply, was certainly crucial
in the decisions. Ultimately, despite the uncertainty
surrounding the doctrine, the resurrection of aesthetic
functionality seems to have brought about some positive
results. Trade mark owners now weigh more carefully
the risks of claiming protection, or attempting to enforce
trade mark rights, in product features for which protection
should have been questionable from the start. Still, legal
battles in this area will surely continue, and the Fleischer
decisions, including Fleischer I, will represent important
precedents for the courts to follow again in countering
overreaching trade mark claims and defending the
copyright bargain against mutant copyrights in the forms
of trade mark protection.
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